How labor market rigidities shape business taxation in a global economy? by Exbrayat, Nelly et al.
How labor market rigidities shape business taxation in a
global economy?
Nelly Exbrayat, Carl Gaigne´, Ste´phane Riou
To cite this version:
Nelly Exbrayat, Carl Gaigne´, Ste´phane Riou. How labor market rigidities shape business
taxation in a global economy?. Working paper GATE 2010-28. 2010. <halshs-00537021>
HAL Id: halshs-00537021
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00537021
Submitted on 18 Nov 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
GROUPE D’ANALYSE ET DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE  LYON ‐ ST ÉTIENNE   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W P 1028 
 
How labor market rigidities shape business taxation 
in a global economy? 
 
 
Nelly Exbrayat, Carl Gaigné, Stéphane Riou 
Novembre 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
oc
um
en
ts
 d
e 
tr
av
ai
l |
 W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon‐St Étienne 
 
93, chemin des Mouilles  69130 Ecully – France 
Tel. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60  
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
 
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint‐Etienne cedex 02 – France  
Tel.  +33 (0)4 77 42 19 60 
Fax. +33 (0)4 77 42 19 50 
 
Messagerie électronique / Email :  gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Téléchargement / Download : http://www.gate.cnrs.fr  – Publications / Working Papers 
 
 
How labor market rigidities shape business taxation
in a global economy?
Nelly Exbrayaty, Carl Gaignéz: and Stéphane Rioux{
October, 2010
Abstract
We investigate the impact of trade liberalization upon the taxation of capital
within a context of labor market rigidities. Using a model of trade and location, we
show that labor market imperfections not only strengthen tax competition but also
a¤ect the relationship between trade integration and tax policies. Capital taxation
follows a J-shaped relationship with trade costs when labor markets are exible,
whereas it may increase with falling trade costs in the presence of trade unions acting
as Stackelberg leaders or playing simultaneously with governments. In addition, we
analyze the outcome which arises from di¤erences between the various countries
labor market institutions. Trade liberalization reduces the international di¤erences
in wage and capital taxation, making the unionized country more attractive.
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1 Introduction
It is now recognized that globalization forces may a¤ect business tax policies by inducing
higher tax base elasticities. Through a panel of 21 countries between 1982 and 1999,
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008) show that the relaxation of capital controls puts
more intense competitive pressure upon corporate tax rates. From data concerning 18
OECD countries over the period 1965-92, Rodrik (1997) nds that taxes on capital respond
negatively to trade openness. There has also been wide theoretical discussion concerning
the impact of economic integration upon corporate tax policies. Most of the papers in
this strand of literature predict that globalization and capital mobility would engender a
race to the bottom in taxation (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1986, Wildasin,
1989).1Nevertheless, much of this literature has assumed perfect labor markets and full
employment. We therefore fail to understand how the relationship between globalization
and capital tax policies depends upon labor market characteristics.
In a paper related to ours, Hungerbühler and van Ypersele (2009) introduce prot and
labor income taxation in a job search framework. Their model predicts that countries
with less distorted labor markets would have a higher prot tax/labor income tax ratio
than countries with severe labor market imperfections.2 For the authors, this would be
in accordance with the tax di¤erential between US and France. More generally, countries
with high levels of labor market imperfections would seek to compensate rms and capital
by low prot tax rates. The present paper analyzes this compensation mechanism within
a context of trade liberalization and aims to answer two main questions. Firstly, to what
extent is the e¤ect of distorted labor markets upon tax competition related to the level
of trade integration between countries? Secondly, what is the tax competition outcome
when countries are asymmetric with respect to their labor market institutions? Indeed,
there are strong arguments for introducing both labor market imperfections and trade
costs in a tax competition analysis.
Firstly, areas exhibiting intense tax interactions also often su¤er from unemployment.
It is commonly admitted that these two problems raise important policy issues in Europe.
Various examples also suggest that adjustments of the corporate tax rates may be decided
with the purpose of compensating for changes in the labor market legislation. In 1998,
1For surveys, see Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Wilson (1999).
2See also Leite-Montero, Marchand and Pestieau (2003), Lejour and Verbon (1986) Fuest and Huber
(1999), Ogawa, Sato and Tamai (2006) for papers exploring the relationship between tax competition
and labor market imperfections.
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the United Kingdom introduced a national minimum wage for the rst time (National
Minimum Wage Act 1998) and, at the same time, decided to make signicant corporate
tax cuts. In May 2007, the US Congress approved the rst increase in the federal minimum
wage in nearly a decade (Fair Labor Standards Act 2007) but President Bush and Senate
Republicans have made business tax breaks a condition for supporting this minimum
wage increase3. Such a strategy has been also adopted by some Canadian provinces after
increases in the minimum wage level (e.g. British Columbia in 2001, Ontario in 2003).
Secondly, it is commonly admitted that trade integration a¤ects labor market out-
comes. By inducing higher labor demand elasticities, trade integration may erode the
bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of rents. As mentioned by Ro-
drik: "The reason is that employers and the nal consumers can substitute foreign workers
for domestic workers more easily - either by investing abroad or by importing the products
made by foreign workers " (Rodrik, 1997, p. 16).4 One might then wonder whether trade
integration could lessen tax competition by reducing wage claims and mitigating the need
for governments to compensate rms for labor market rigidities. We answer this question
in this paper, by clarifying the impact of trade integration on business tax policies under
wage rigidities.
To address our questions, we build a simple tax competition model with trade and
imperfections on both labor and product markets. Our approach may be considered as an
extension of economic geography literature with tax competition (Andersson and Forslid,
2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Gaigné and Riou, 2007; Hauer and Wooton, 2010,
Ottaviano and Van Ypersele, 2005). Indeed, all these papers consider perfectly competi-
tive labor markets and inelastic labor supply. We assume that labor market rigidities arise
from a monopoly union, whereas the product market is characterized by an oligopolistic
industry where rms produce under increasing returns to scale. In addition, contrary
to the conclusions o¤ered in the standard literature concerning tax competition, deci-
sions concerning the location of capital are not simply driven by costs factors (taxes and
wages) but also by other economic considerations such as increasing returns, trade costs,
and market structures (Head and Mayer, 2004). Finally, we adopt a game-theoretic ap-
proach where rms, governments, and unions act non-cooperatively and consider di¤erent
sequences of events.
3The two chambers accepted tax breaks worth $8.3 billion over a period of 10 years. The previous
increase in the US minimum wage in 1996 was also associated with 4,8 billion dollars worth of tax breaks.
4See also the literature on international unionized oligopolies (Naylor,1998, 1999; Lommerud et al.,
2003).
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Our main results can be summarized as follows. We rst show that the impact of trade
integration on tax policies strongly depends upon the conguration of the labor market.
When the labor market is competitive in both countries, the Nash capital tax rate follows
a J-shaped relationship with trade costs. By contrast, when labor markets are unionized
and unions act as Stackelberg leaders or play simultaneously with governments, trade
integration may cause an increase in capital taxation. Indeed, falling trade costs raise the
labor demand elasticity and thus reduce wage claims, so that governments are less incited
to cut capital taxes in order to attract rms. Secondly, when countries di¤er with respect
to their labor market institutions, the capital tax is lower in the unionized country but
the resulting location of capital is a priori ambiguous. We show that a majority of capital
is invested in the unionized country, provided that the relative importance of wages over
employment for the trade union is not too high. Interestingly, trade liberalization leads
to a convergence in wages and taxes, making the unionized country more attractive. The
latter result remains valid whatever the timing of events. We therefore bring a new insight
to the locational e¤ects of asymmetric tax competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop the
model. In section 3, we analyze the tax competition outcome in the benchmark case,
where both labor markets are competitive. In sections 4 and 5 respectively, we consider
the existence of a monopoly union in both countries and an asymmetric conguration
where the labor market is unionized in only one country. The robustness of the results is
discussed in section 6. The last section concludes.
2 Model
The economy consists of two countries, labeled i = H;F . Variables associated with each
country will be subscripted accordingly. Because we focus on the impact of labor market
imperfections and trade liberalization upon tax policies, we control for any exogenous
advantage by assuming countries with identical market sizes and the same technology.
We denote by l the mass of workers/consumers living in each country. Each individual
works and consumes in the country she lives in. Moreover, each resident is endowed with
k units of capital that she/he inelastically supplies. Thus, there are n  2lk units of
capital in the economy and capital is internationally mobile. Finally, the government of
each country is benevolent and maximizes the total welfare of its residents by levying a
lump-sum tax on capital (ti) on the source principle and a lump-sum tax on workers (i).
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2.1 Preferences
In order to make the model analytically tractable, we assume that all workers have the
same quasi-linear utility with respect to a numéraire (z), a homogeneous (manufactured)
good, and the same disutility from labor5. Thus, a consumer residing in country i solves
the following problem:
Max
xdi ;l
s
i
ui 

a  x
d
i
2

xdi + z  

2
(lsi )
2 (1)
s:t: yi = x
d
i pi + z (2)
where a > 0, xdi is the individual consumption level of the manufactured good, z is the
individual consumption of the numéraire, lsi is the individual labor supply and  > 0 is a
measure for the preference for leisure. The variable yi is the net income which depends
on the status of the individual on the labor market:
yi = z + rk + wil
s
i   i for employed workers (3)
yi = z + rk + bi for unemployed workers
with z the quantity of numéraire endowed by each worker, wi the national wage rate, and
r the world net return to capital. Thus, rk denotes the individual net income of capital
while wilsi is the individual labor income.
6 Finally, bi are unemployment benets for each
unemployed individual, which are assumed to be exogenous. It should be noted that the
numéraire is unproduced, costlessly tradable and the initial endowment z is large enough
for the individual consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive at the market
outcome7.
2.2 Technology and market structure
Firms produce a homogeneous product with increasing returns to scale and behave as
Cournot competitors.8 The production of the manufactured good requires a xed amount
5Although the income e¤ect is erased with a quasi-linear utility, Dinopoulos et al. (2007, p.22), show
that this type of preferences behave reasonably well in the models of international trade.
6Hence, residents are both workers and capital owners. This assumption is standard in the tax
competition literature, even in the presence of unemployment (see Ogawa et al., 2006; Fuest and Huber,
1999; Richter and Schneider, 2001).
7The model can easily be extended by introducing a second sector producing the numéraire under
constant returns and perfect competition, using a specic factor that is in xed supply.
8Using a monopolistic competition model of economic geography à la Ottaviano and Van Ypersele
(2005) does not qualitatively change the results. Without product di¤erentiation, the equilibrium prices
are lower but react in the same way to a change in trade costs and the spatial distribution of rms.
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f of labor units and one unit of capital, so that n is also the number of rms in the
economy. Shipping the manufactured good is costly. Specically, rms incur a trade cost
of  > 0 units of the numéraire per unit of good shipped between the two countries. We
assume that product markets are segmented and that labor markets are national. Each
rm determines a quantity specic to the country in which it sells its output and wages can
di¤er from one country to another because workers are internationally immobile. Hence,
quantities, prices, and wages are specic to each country but interdependent because of
capital mobility.
The operating prots of a rm located in country i are given by
i = pixii + (pj   )xij (4)
where xii is the quantity that it supplies to domestic consumers, xij is the quantity it sells
to foreign consumers and pi is the price prevailing in country i. Thus, its net prots are
expressed as follows:
i = i   fwi   ri   ti (5)
where ri is the rental rate of capital in country i. In the long run, ri is equalized across
countries due to capital mobility.
2.3 Labor market regimes
We consider two types of wage setting regimes: a competitive labor market, and a trade
union. The latter regime induces a higher wage than the competitive wage thereby gen-
erating unemployment.
A. Wage exibility Under the competitive labor market regime, the equilibrium wage
is simply determined by the labor market clearing condition which will be described in
section 3.1.
B. Monopoly union Three types of models with unionized labor markets are currently
considered in the literature on trade unions: the monopoly union model, the wage bar-
gaining model and e¢ cient bargaining models (see. Oswald, 1985). Here, we choose the
rst alternative where the labor market is dominated by a monopoly union which chooses
a wage for all rms in the country subject to the labor demand function. The monopoly
union can be seen as a special case because unions hold all the bargaining power. Never-
theless, our purpose being to highlight the way in which trade integration may a¤ect the
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relationships between labor market rigidities and capital taxation, it is reasonable in a
rst approach to assume two polar labor market regimes.9 Moreover, the combination of
linear Cournot oligopoly and monopoly unions is commonplace in the literature.10 Union
preferences are characterized by the following Stone-Geary-type utility function:
Ui = (w
u
i   w) (Ldi )1  (6)
with wui the nominal wage rate set by the union in country i, L
d
i the level of employment
in country i, and w the reservation wage rate11. As emphasized by Cahuc and Zylberberg
(1991), the objective function above is a simple way of considering that unions are con-
cerned by both wages and employment and it also avoids assigning an arbitrary value to
the preference of unions. Hence, the parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the relative impor-
tance of wages over employment for the trade union. Moreover, this general specication
allows us to address the standard rent maximization hypothesis with  = 0:5 (see. Naylor,
1998, 1999; Straume, 2003; Lommerud et al., 2003).
2.4 Governments
Governments maximize the welfare of their residents by non-cooperatively choosing the
per-unit tax on capital (ti) and on employed workers (i). Following Persson and Tabellini
(1992) in assuming that taxes exist only for the purpose of redistributing income, we
disregard e¢ ciency considerations of public good provision. Given the one-to-one corre-
spondence between rms and capital, the budget constraint is given by:
tini + il
e
i = bil
u
i (7)
where lei is the number of workers in employment whereas l
u
i is the number of unemployed
workers. Inserting (2), (3) in (1) and after rearrangements, we obtain the aggregate
welfare in each country:
Wi = lSi + rkl + l
e
i
h
wil
s
i  

2
(lsi )
2   i
i
+ lui bi + constant (8)
where Si denotes the consumers surplus. The national welfare is the sum of six terms:
total consumerssurplus, capital income, labor income, disutility from labor, labor tax
9The assumption that workers are shareholders would be problematic for the two other types of model.
In this case, both parties would negotiate for the same interest.
10Examples are Bughin and Vannini (1995), Lejour and Verbon (1996), Leahy and Montagna (2000),
Lommerud et al. (2003), Naylor (1998, 1999), Straume (2003), Richter and Schneider (2001), and Leite-
Monteiro et al. (2003).
11It is assumed that unions have perfect information about the labor demand function.
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income, benets to unemployed residents and a constant equal to the total endowment
of numéraire. Therefore, the maximization program of governments is tightly related to
the labor market performance. When the labor market is competitive, lui = 0 and l
e
i = l,
while lui > 0 and l
e
i < l (with l
u
i + l
e
i = l) under labor market imperfections. When the
wage is higher than the competitive wage, we obtain Ldi = l
s
i l
e
i where l
s
i stands for labor
units supplied by each worker so that
lei = L
d
i =l
s
i . (9)
2.5 Sequence of events
The model consists of a sequential game where the players are workers, rms, governments
and trade unions. In the absence of trade unions, each government decides the level of
its per-unit tax on labor and capital in the rst stage of the game, taking as given the
decision of the other government and anticipating the resulting location equilibrium as
well as the private sector outcome. In the second stage, residents choose the location
of their capital investment given the tax policy choices announced by governments and
anticipating the private sector outcome. In the last stage, rms and residents make their
production, consumption and labor allocation choices, respectively, taking as given the
level of taxes chosen by governments.
In the presence of trade unions and governments, three possible congurations should
be considered: the union is a Stackelberg leader, the government is a Stackelberg leader,
and both play Nash. The choice of the most representative sequence of events can be
related to the duration of the policy set by each player. As Hersoug (1985) argued, union
can be considered as a leader as wage contracts often have a longer duration than one
year whereas changes in the tax policy would occur more frequently. There is however, no
consensus on this point. Clearly, the game can also be related to the relative strength of the
players and this brings us back to the degree of centralization of the wage setting (Boeters
and Schneider, 1999). Our model being based on a highly centralized wage setting, it
seems reasonable to assign the role of the Stackelberg leader to the monopoly union as a
benchmark case. Alternatively, the case where both parties decide simultaneously might
be plausible. This last case is reported in the Appendix where we show that it yields fairly
similar results. To complete our robustness analysis, a third case where governments act
as Stackelberg leaders is also described in the Appendix and the results are rigorously
compared with the two rst congurations.
8
3 Tax competition with perfectly competitive labor
markets
Werst describe the tax competition outcome in the benchmark case without labor market
imperfections. The game is solved by a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium involving
backward induction beginning with the last stage.
Let 0    1 stand for the share of capital in countryH.12 In order to disentangle the
various e¤ects at work, we distinguish between what we call a short-run equilibrium, in
which capital is supposed to be immobile, i.e.  is exogenous; and a long-run equilibrium
where it is mobile, i.e.  is endogenous. We rst present the product and labor market
outcomes in the short-run. Then, we describe capital location and governmentstax policy
in the long-run.
3.1 Product and labor market outcomes (stage 3)
Given (1) and (2), the individual demand for the manufactured good in country i is given
by xdi = a pi. In addition, maximizing (5) with respect to xii and xij yields the following
quantity choices at the equilibrium: xii = lpi and xij = l (pj   ). Thus, the supply to the
domestic market depends exclusively upon the market size (constant in both countries)
and upon the price at which goods are sold in each market. Additionally, the supply to
the foreign market decreases with the level of trade barriers. Finally, the market-clearing
condition of the manufacturing sector requires that (a  pi) l = nixii + njxji where ni is
the mass of rms or capital located in country i. Hereafter, we denote by a subscript 
variables at the short-run equilibrium. Solving the market-clearing condition gives the
equilibrium price in country i:
pi =
a+ nj
1 + n
(10)
The price in country i increases with trade barriers, because the local rms are more
protected against foreign competition, and with the mass of rms located abroad because,
in this case, the local competition is less intense. These prices lead to the following
operating prots:
i = (p

i )
2 l + (pj   )2l (11)
12Hereafter, the terms capitaland rmsare indi¤erently used as a rm needs one capital unit to
produce.
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We assume that the trade cost is non-prohibitive so that prices net of trade costs are
positive whatever the spatial distribution of rms:
 <  trade  a
1 + n
:
We now turn to the labor market outcome. By inserting the budget constraint (2) in
the residents utility function (1) and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to
lsi , we get the following equilibrium individual labor supply in country i:
lsi = wi= (12)
so that the total supply of labor units is given by lwi=. Hence, our approach di¤ers from
existing models of trade and location with tax competition where labor supply is inelastic.
In our framework, individual labor supply depends upon wages and the disutility from
labor. The national demand for labor units, related to the requirement of labor and the
number of rms, is given by:
Ldi = fni (13)
Thus, the labor market clearing condition yields the following wage rate equilibrium in
country i:
wcc;i = fni=l (14)
where the subscript cc stands for the description of the outcome when labor markets are
competitive in both countries. Clearly, the competitive wage prevailing in a country is a
decreasing function of the number of workers and an increasing function of the number
of rms located in this country.
3.2 Location of capital (stage 2)
Due to free entry and exit, there are no prots in equilibrium. The equilibrium rental rate
in each country is thus determined by a bidding process for capital, which ends when no
rm can earn a strictly positive prot at the equilibrium market price:
ri = 

i   fwcc;i   tcci : (15)
The location of capital is governed by the spatial di¤erence in net returns to capital (15),
evaluated at equilibrium prices (10) and wages (14). A spatial equilibrium  2 (0; 1) (with
nH = n and nF = (1  )n) is such that no unit of capital can induce a higher return by
being invested in another country. Formally, an interior equilibrium arises at cc 2 (0; 1)
10
when H(
cc)  fwcc;H (cc)  tccH = F (cc)  fwcc;F (cc)  tccF . Solving this equality with
respect to the share of capital invested in country H (cc) yields the location equilibrium
for given taxes:
cc =
1
2
  (1 + n) (t
cc
H   tccF )
4nl 2 + 2f 2 (1 + n)n=l
: (16)
Some comments are in order. The location equilibrium is mainly the result of three
mechanisms. The rst is standard and known in the economic geography literature as a
pro-competitive e¤ect. When a country hosts new rms/capital, existing domestic rms
face more competitors in their domestic market and fewer in the foreign one. Thus, the
domestic price falls whereas the foreign price rises (see 10). Domestic sales generate more
revenues than foreign sales because of the trade cost (see 11), so that this e¤ect acts as a
dispersion force. The pressure on the cost of labor induced by the agglomeration of rms is
the second force a¤ecting the international allocation of capital. Indeed, the attractiveness
of the country with the scal advantage is moderated for high xed requirements in labor
(f) and high disutility from labor (). In this case, the scal advantage is counteracted
by a strong wage pressure which incites rms to relocate. Finally, the location choice
is a¤ected by the tax wedge. Unsurprisingly, a unilateral rise in capital taxation in a
country leads to an outow of capital from this country (dcc=dtccH < 0).
The tax base elasticity in country H is given by:
"ccH() =  
@cc
@tccH
tccH
cc
=
(1 + n) tccH
2nl 2 + f 2 (1 + n)n=l   (1 + n) (tccH   tccF )
and the tax base elasticity in country F can be derived by symmetry. Clearly, trade
integration makes capital more responsive to a change in the tax wedge (d"cci =d < 0).
Observe from (10) that prices become less and less sensitive to the spatial distribution
of rms as trade costs decrease. Through this e¤ect, trade integration weakens the dis-
persion force associated with price competition and strengthens the weight of taxes in
the capital location choice. Stated di¤erently, even small changes in the relative costs of
doing business can induce important changes in capital location as the world economy is
becoming more closely integrated.
It is also worth stressing that the tax base elasticity is weakened by high levels in
labor input requirement and in disutility from labor, both raising the equilibrium wage.
More generally, when country i decreases its capital taxation, the resulting capital inow
increases the wage cost by shifting labor demand upwards. In other words, the attrac-
tiveness e¤ect of a tax cut is limited by the upward adjustments of the wage rate.
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3.3 Equilibrium tax policies (stage 1)
We now solve the rst stage of the game and characterize the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (the subscript ~ refers to variables evaluated at the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium). When the labor market is competitive, lui = 0 and l
e
i = l, so that the
governments budget constraint amounts to:
 il = ticci n (17)
Since budgets have to be balanced, the policy problem faced by each government is one-
dimensional: the choice of the capital tax rate determines the tax rate on workers required
to satisfy the budget constraint.
Inserting the equilibrium level of labor supply (12), prices (10) and competitive wage
rates (14) in the welfare function (8), with the constraints that lui = 0 and l
e
i = l, the
objective function of each government amounts to:
W cci = lS

i +
n
2
r + ti
cc
i n+ l
(wcc;i )
2
2
+ constant (18)
where r represents the net return to capital at the location equilibrium while the fourth
term represents the gross total wages of residents minus their disutility from labor. The
consumer surplus Si , evaluated at equilibrium price in country i, is given by:
Si =
1
2
n2 (a   (1  cci ))2
(1 + n)2
(19)
Before proceeding further with the analysis, we isolate how each component of the
aggregate welfare reacts in response to a tax variation. Let us rst consider the e¤ect
of a variation of capital taxation on the domestic consumers surplus. By introducing
the location equilibrium in (19), we can easily show that in order to lower prices in its
domestic market each government has an incentive to set a low tax burden on capital:
dSi
dti
=
@Si
@pi
@pi
@cci
@cci
@tcci
< 0:
Secondly, the e¤ect of a marginal variation of ti on the net return to capital is given
by:
dr
dti
=
@i
@pi
@pi
@cci
@cci
@tcci| {z }
+
 f @w
cc
i
@cci
@cci
@tcci| {z }
+
  1:
This expression encapsulates one direct e¤ect and two indirect e¤ects. We rst focus on
the indirect e¤ects. By inducing more price competition among rms, a tax cut reduces
12
the operating prots. In addition, when a unilateral tax cut is decided the labor demand
shifts upwards and the cost of labor rises. Hence, an unilateral decrease in corporate tax
gives rise to a lower gross-of-tax capital income. Nevertheless, as expected, a lower tax
burden has a direct positive e¤ect on the net capital income.
Depending on the sign of tcci , the third term in (18) describes the capital tax revenues
or the scal contribution of workers as taxation is assumed to be redistributive. Formally,
we have
d (ti
cc
i n)
dtcci
= cci n+ t
cc
i n
@cci
@tci
= cin(1  "cci ):
Again, the net e¤ect of a unilateral tax change is ambiguous. Starting from positive
capital taxation, the tax base elasticity has to be low enough in order to allow a rise in
the capital tax to increase capital tax revenues.
Finally, we can investigate the e¤ect of the tax policy upon the labor market com-
ponent of the welfare equation, that is the gross labor incomes minus the disutility from
labor. After substitutions and simplications, we obtain
d

l (wcc;i )
2
=2

dtcci
=
f 2n2
2l
@(cci )
2
@tcci
< 0
Clearly, reducing the tax burden on capital positively a¤ects the wage rate net of the
disutility from labor. The mechanism at work is simple: a tax cut generates an inow of
capital that increases the level of the competitive wage.
Maximizing (18) with respect to tcci , we get the equilibrium tax on capital in each
country
tcci =  
nl [2a   (2n+ 3)]
2 (1 + n)2
 ~tcc: (20)
Trivial calculations reveal ~tcc > 0 as long as  >  with
  2a
2n+ 3
<  trade:
Below a threshold level of trade costs (), governments subsidize capital and tax the
labor income. Furthermore, capital taxes describe a J-shaped curve with respect to 
since d~tcc=d T 0 when  R =2. Starting from high trade costs (  ), a gradual fall
in trade barriers reduces capital taxes. When trade liberalization reaches intermediate
levels ( >  > =2), governments subsidize capital. Hence, the subsidy level rises as
trade costs decline further. Nevertheless, when trade costs reach =2, the cost for workers
to nance higher subsidies for rms exceeds the benets they enjoy from this policy.
Consequently, the subsidy level for capital shrinks and ~tcc tends to zero when trade
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liberalization approaches free trade. Put di¤erently, tax competition is relaxed when trade
costs reach low values13.
Given the perfect symmetry of the model, the location equilibrium is symmetric (that
is, ~
cc
= 1=2). Inserting it into the competitive wage (14), we get the level of wages ~wcc
in each country at the location equilibrium:
~wccH = ~w
cc
F =
fn
2l
 ~wcc (21)
4 Tax competition with a unionized labor market in
both countries
We now extend our basic model to the case where the wage setting is centralized and
a monopoly union operates as Stackelberg leader in each country. Therefore, our model
is now a fourth-stage game. The product market outcome arising at the fourth stage
of the game is given by expressions (11) and (10) (Section 3.1). In the following sub-
sections, we solve the previous stages where rms make their location choices (section
4.1), governments set their tax policy (section 4.2), and trade unions set wages (section
4.3).
4.1 Capital location and tax base elasticities (stage 3)
Let uu denote the share of capital located in country H when both labor markets are
unionized. The choice of capital location is made for given levels of wages chosen by unions
(wuui ) and given corporate taxes in each country (t
uu
i ). Thus, the location equilibrium
arises when H(
uu)   tuuH   fwuuH = F (uu)   tuuF   fwuuF . Solving this equality with
respect to uu yields the following location equilibrium:
uu(tuui ; w
uu
i ) =
1
2
  (1 + n)[f (w
uu
H   wuuF ) + tuuH   tuuF ]
4l 2n
: (22)
From this expression, we can deduce the tax base elasticity for capital invested in country
H:
"uuH () =  
@uu
@tuuH
tuuH
uu
=
tuuH (n+ 1)
2ln 2   (n+ 1) (tuuH   tuuF )  f (wuuH   wuuF ) (n+ 1)
(23)
13Interestingly, we thereby show that the J-shaped relationship between capital taxes and trade costs,
which was rst demonstrated in the tax competition literature based on NEG models with a constant
wage (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind et al., 2000; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Hauer and
Wooton, 2010), also holds when wages increase with the number of domestic rms.
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and a symmetrical expression holds for the tax base elasticity in country F . As in the
benchmark case with competitive labor markets, a unilateral increase in the capital tax
yields a capital outow. However, we have "uui () > "
cc
i () at the symmetric equilibrium
(wuuH = w
uu
F ). Indeed, the positive impact of agglomeration upon wages in a exible labor
market disappears in the presence of trade unions. For the same reason, trade integration
makes capital location more responsive to taxes than in the case of perfectly competitive
labor markets (d"uui =d < d"
cc
i =d < 0):
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4.2 Nash tax policies (stage 2)
Because of distortions on the labor market, each government is now faced with two cat-
egories of households depending upon their position in the labor market (employed or
unemployed). Labor tax is levied exclusively on employed residents and each national
government provides benets b to unemployed residents. As a result, the governments
budget constraint in country i amounts to:
tuui 
uu
i n+ il
e
i = bi(l   lei ) (24)
where lei = L
d
i =l
s
i = f
uu
i n=w
uu
i . This leads to intuitive relationships: unemployment
increases with the wage set by the unions while it decreases with the number of rms, the
xed requirement of labor and the preference for leisure. With (24) and after rearrange-
ments, the objective function of each government is given as:
W uui = lS

i +
rn
2
+ tuui n
uu
i +
1
2
(wuui )
2

lei + constant (25)
where uui is given by equation (22) for i = H. At this stage, the wage rate is exogenous
and governments cannot inuence the wage claims of the domestic union by manipulating
taxes accordingly in order to a¤ect the location of capital. Nevertheless, the tax policy
will have a direct e¤ect on the spatial distribution of capital and then on the number of
workers employed lei . By maximizing (25) with respect to ti for each government, we get
the following Nash tax equilibrium:
tuui = t
cc +
f

wuuj (2n+ 3)  wuui (10n+ 13)

4 (4n+ 5)
(26)
with j 6= i. Several comments are in order. First, for given wages, the tax rate in each
country reacts to a change in trade costs in exactly the same way as when both labor
14Intuitively, this analysis is also valid in the case of an exogenous wage in each country and more
generally for all wage rigidities such that agglomeration has no impact upon the cost of labor.
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markets are competitive (dtuui =d ? 0 when  ? =2, 8 i = H;F ). Secondly, the tax
rate in a country decreases with the national wage rate and increases with the wage rate
of its trading partner (dtuui =dw
uu
i < 0 and dt
uu
i =dw
uu
j > 0). Thus, the intensity of tax
competition is closely related with the labor market outcome and this preliminary result
illustrates the possibility of using taxation to compensate rms for high labor costs.
4.3 Equilibrium wage rates (stage 1)
Having described the optimal choice of tax rates by governments, we can solve the maxi-
mization program of monopoly unions to dene the equilibrium wage rate in each country.
Each labor union sets wuui non-cooperatively to maximize (6) with L
d
i = fn
uu
i
 
wuui ; w
uu
j

by anticipating capital location and the tax choices made by governments. Hence, in stage
1, the share of capital located in country H is now given by:
uu (tuui ; w
uu
i ) =
1
2
  (w
uu
H   wuuF ) (1 + n)2 f
4 (4n+ 5) l 2n
(27)
where we have introduced (26) in (22).
Let us rst look at the resulting labor demand schedule and its responsiveness to trade
integration. Inserting this location equilibrium in the national labor demand function Ldi ,
we can verify that a high wage reduces labor demand (dLdi =dw
uu
i < 0). Nevertheless, we
can observe that the response of labor demand to wages is the result of two opposite forces.
First, high wages have a standard negative e¤ect in terms of attractiveness, which causes
a decrease in the labor demand. Secondly, monopoly unions anticipate that high wages
lead the government to set low taxes on capital (see 26). Thus, the negative impact upon
the attractiveness of high wage claims is moderated by the tax adjustment. Formally, the
labor demand elasticity with respect to the wage rate in country i is expressed as follows:
i =  
dLdi
dwuui
wuui
Ldi
=
wuui f (1 + n)
2
2ln 2 (4n+ 5)  f (1 + n)2 (wuui   wuuj )
with i > 0 at the symmetric equilibrium. We can observe that i decreases with  . In
other words, trade integration increases the labor demand elasticity. Interestingly, this
result illustrates Rodriks intuition that trade increases the degree to which employers
can react to changes in prevailing wages by outsourcing or investing abroad (Rodrik,
1997, p. 12-13).
Now, we can describe the trade-o¤ for monopoly unions. While choosing high wages
increases the workersgross income, it reduces labor demand and leads more people to
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become unemployed. The total e¤ect of a wage increase on the wage bill depends upon the
relative strength of each e¤ect. Inserting the labor demand function into the monopoly
unions objective function and maximizing the corresponding expression with respect to
wuui , we get the following reaction function for the trade union in country i:
wuui = w
uu
j + (1  )w + 
2l 2n (4n+ 5)
f (n+ 1)2
Consequently, the equilibrium wage rates are given by:15
~wuuH = ~w
uu
F = w +

1  
2l 2n(4n+ 5)
(1 + n)2 f
 ~wuu (28)
Interestingly, the wage rate declines with trade integration (d ~wuu=d > 0 and d2 ~wuu=d 2 >
0). By increasing the labor demand elasticity to the wage rate, trade integration forces
trade unions to lower the wage rates in order to reduce the negative e¤ect of a high wage
on labor demand and the resulting level of employment. This result is the opposite of
that which was found by Naylor (1998), according to which wages increase with trade
integration when the spatial distribution of rms is exogenous. Thus, ignoring the fact
that high wages might deter investments, Naylors model cannot capture the e¤ect of
trade costs on the aggregate labor demand elasticity. The only channel through which
trade costs a¤ect labor demand comes from the positive impact of a decline in trade costs
upon the total output and employment of each rm. Within our framework, we do not
capture this e¤ect because we consider that the marginal labor requirement equals to zero.
This allows us to isolate and determine how the relationship between trade integration
and wages can be a¤ected by capital mobility and its impact upon the demand for labor.
In this way, trade integration increases the tax base elasticity and, in ne, raises the
labor demand elasticity, in accordance with empirical studies. Indeed, from US data,
Slaughter (2001) shows that the demand for production labor has become more elastic
in manufacturing: the elasticity reached -0.5 by the mid-1970s and around -1.0 in 1991.
Hasan et al. (2007) also show that labor demand elasticities within the manufacturing
sector rose after the trade reforms in India. To summarize our results,
Proposition 1 Assume monopoly unions in each country playing as Stackelberg leaders.
Under capital tax competition, the equilibrium wage rate set by unions decreases with trade
integration.
15At these levels of equilibrium wages, the second-order condition is checked.
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Having determined the equilibrium level of wages in each country, we can evaluate the
capital taxes at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). By introducing (28) in
(26), we get:
~tuui = ~t
cc   fw
2
  
1  
l 2n(5 + 4n)
(1 + n)2
 ~tuu
with ~tuu < ~tcc. Clearly, a more aggressive tax policy takes place to compensate rms
for wage rigidity. As expected, the higher the importance attached to the wage in the
unions objective function, the lower the level of capital tax (d~tuu=d < 0). Moreover,
the existence of a trade union implies that the conguration where workers become the
net-contributors of the public sector emerges earlier in the process of trade integration.
Proposition 2 Assume monopoly unions in each country both playing as Stackelberg
leaders. A shift from a exible labor market to a unionized labor market strengthens
capital tax competition, regardless of trade costs.
How do capital taxes at the SPNE react to trade integration? Some calculations reveal
that the equilibrium level of the capital tax rate increases with trade integration provided
that the relative importance of wages over employment for the trade union is high enough.
Indeed, we have:
d~tuu
d
< 0 i¤

1   >
(2n+ 3)(   =2)
2 (4n+ 5) 
:
Hence, when  < =2, both ~tcc and ~tuu increase with trade integration. However, when
 > =2, a fall in trade costs decreases ~tcc but raises ~tuu if and only if  is above a threshold
level  with
 =
a   (2n+ 3)
a   (10n+ 13)
The latter relationship arises for the following reason. The third term in (??) captures
the negative e¤ect of the wage set by unions on corporate tax, and this e¤ect is magnied
by high levels of . Thus, provided that  is high enough, the erosion of this negative
wage e¤ect on taxation due to trade integration counterbalances the opposite direct e¤ect
on ~tcc. Hence, contrary to the conguration with a competitive wage, trade integration
always relaxes tax competition when  is high enough. This scenario occurs, for example,
under the rent maximization hypothesis. By contrast, when the importance attached to
the employment in the unions objective function is relatively high, wages tend to be closer
to the reference wage rate (w) so that the magnitude of the changes in wages is lower and
trade integration intensies tax competition. The subgame perfect Nash tax equilibrium
is thus less dependent upon the labor market outcome and increases with trade costs.
To summarize:
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Proposition 3 Assume monopoly unions in each country both playing as Stackelberg
leaders. When trade costs are above =2, trade openness relaxes (resp. strengthens) capital
tax competition, provided that the relative importance of wages over employment for unions
is high (resp. low) enough. Once trade costs decline below =2, trade integration relaxes
capital tax competition regardless of the relative importance of wages over employment for
unions.
To complete our analysis, we briey investigate the level of unemployment and labor
tax at the SPNE. Assume that the reservation wage is equal to the competitive wage
given by (21). The number of unemployed people in each country is given by:
~lui =
4l3 (4n+ 5)  2
 24l2 (4n+ 5) + f 2 (n+ 1)2 (1  ) > 0 (29)
It is worth noting that as trade integration results in a lower wage set by the union, it
also reduces unemployment in the economy (d~lui =d > 0). Considering the impact of a
trade cost reduction upon the level of the labor tax is a more complex task. From the
budget constraint (24), the labor tax in country i is given by:
~uui =
bi~l
u
i   ~tuu~nuui
~lei
: (30)
Clearly, trade liberalization may have an ambiguous e¤ect on labor tax at the SPNE.
By expanding the tax base (~lei ) and reducing the budget allocated to unemployment bene-
ts (bi~lui ), trade integration could result in a lower tax burden on labor. Nevertheless, the
net e¤ect also depends upon the impact of trade costs on ~tuu, the spatial distribution of
capital being equal among countries at the SNPE (~nuui = n=2). As corollary of Proposi-
tion 3, below the threshold level (=2), the labor tax unambiguously decreases with trade
integration. Above this threshold level, ~uui may decrease with trade liberalization pro-
vided that the wage claims are high enough to give rise to a positive relationship between
capital taxation and trade integration. Finally, it is straightforward to check that trade
integration e¤ects passing through bi~luui and ~l
e
i are weakened when  tends to zero, as the
labor market tends towards a exible wage setting.
5 Asymmetric labor market regimes
Countries can be very di¤erent with respect to their labor market institutions, and this
could partly explain the variations in labor market performance across di¤erent countries
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(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). In this section, we keep the assumption that monopoly
unions are Stackelberg leaders but we analyze tax competition between countries that
di¤er with respect to their labor market institutions. More precisely, we investigate the tax
competition outcome between a country with a competitive labor market and a country
in which the wage rate is set by a monopoly union.
5.1 Capital location and tax base elasticities (stage 3)
We assume that the national wage in country F is xed by a monopoly union while there
are no labor market imperfections in the other country. The spatial equilibrium cu is
achieved when H(
cu)  tcuH   fwcuH (cu) = F (cui )  tcuF   fwcuF , and given by:
cu =
2l 2n+ wcuF f (1 + n)  (1 + n) (tcuH   tcuF )
4nl 2 + f 2 (1 + n)n=l
: (31)
It is not surprising that, for given and equal taxes, country H will host more capital/rms
than in the symmetrical conguration (cu > cc) as long as the wage rate chosen by the
monopoly union in country F is higher than the competitive wage resulting from the
competitive labor market (wcuF > ~w
cc).
The tax base elasticities in country H and F are expressed as follows:
"cuH () =  
@cu
@tcuH
tcuH
cu
=
(1 + n) tcuH
2l 2n+ wcuF f (1 + n)  (1 + n) (tcuH   tcuF )
"cuF () =  
@(1  cu)
@tcuF
tcuF
1  cu =
(1 + n) tcuF
2l 2n+ f (1 + n) (fn=l   wcuF ) + (1 + n) (tcuH   tcuF )
:
For each country, we compare the tax base elasticity in the asymmetric conguration
with the tax base elasticity that would result if both countries adopted a free labor market
institution. Some standard calculations show:
"cuF > "
cc
F (32)
"cuH Q "ccH i¤ wcuF R fn=l = 2 ~wcc: (33)
The tax base elasticity of the unionized country is always higher than if there were no
labor market imperfections, as is the case for its trading partner. Indeed, following a
marginal tax increase in the unionized country, the wage does not shift downward due to
the capital outow, contrary to what happens with a exible wage setting. Consequently,
the capital location is more responsive to a change in tax rate.
It is also worth stressing that tax base elasticity in country H closely depends upon
the wage claims in country F . When the wage set by the monopoly union is high enough
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(wcuF > 2 ~w
cc), capital invested in country H has less incentive to relocate in country F
following a rise in tH . Hence, by keeping its labor market regime unchanged, country H
can benet from a lower tax base elasticity when country F is the single country to move
from a free labor market to an unionized labor market.
5.2 Nash tax equilibrium (stage 2)
We now describe the Nash tax equilibrium. As the labor market legislation di¤ers between
countries, each national government has a di¤erent objective function and a di¤erent
budget constraint. The objective function of country H is given by (18), whereas the
objective function of the government of country F , which has to deal with unemployment,
is given by (25). Moreover, the location equilibrium is now given by (31).
Solving the rst-order condition for each government, we get the following Nash tax
equilibrium:
tcui = t
cc + 
i (w
cu
F ; ) (34)
with

H (w
cu
F ; ) 
l 2f (2n+ 3) (lwcuF   fn)
4 (4l2n+ 5l2)  2 + f 2 (n+ 1)2

F (w
cu
F ; ) 
 (1 + n)2 f 2(nf   3lwcuF ) + l2 2[(2n+ 3) nf   (10n+ 13) lwcuF ]
4l[f (1 + n)2 + l2 2 (4n+ 5) =f ]
< 0:
It appears that tcuF < t
cc as long as wcuF > ~w
cc. In other words, a shift from a exible
labor market to a unionized labor market in a single country (here country F ) lowers the
capital tax rate in this country. This result arises from the higher tax base elasticity in
the latter labor market regime (see (32)) and the need to compensate rms for a labor
cost above its competitive level. By contrast, tcuH > t
cc if and only if wcuF > 2 ~w
cc. Thus, tax
pressure on capital rises in the country which maintains a exible labor market, provided
that its trading partners union wage is high enough. Indeed, in this case, country H
benets from both a lower tax base elasticity (see (33)) and a high labor cost in country
F , allowing its government to set higher tax pressure on capital.
It is easy to check that tcuH   tcuF > 0 as long as wcuF > ~wcc so that the existence of
trade unions within a country enables its trading partner to set a higher capital tax rate.
Moreover, an increasing wage set by the union in country F induces a higher tax wedge.
Indeed, the labor cost disadvantage being stronger in country F , its government has to
decide on a tax cut to maintain capital while country H can increase the tax burden on
capital. In addition, for a given wage in country F (wcuF ), it is straightforward to check
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that @ (tcuH   tcuF ) =@ > 0 if and only if wcuF > 2 ~wcc. Hence, trade integration favors a
lower tax wedge when the wage set by the union reaches high values.
Finally, we know that an increase in wcuF negatively (resp. positively) a¤ects the capital
tax rate in country F (resp. in countryH). Hence, if an increase in wcuF favors the location
of capital in country H, that also magnies the tax wedge and thus indirectly favors the
location of capital in country F . Thus, the e¤ect of the wage set by the monopoly union
on the international allocation of capital is ambiguous. At Nash equilibrium tax rates,
we obtain the following location equilibrium:
cu =
1
2
+
f (n+ 1)2 (lwcuF   nf)
4n[f 2 (1 + n)2 + l2 2 (4n+ 5)]
(35)
revealing that an increase in wcuF favors the location of capital in the country where there
are no wage rigidities. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that cu > 1=2 if and only if
wcuF > 2 ~w
cc. Hence, the country where there are labor market rigidities can accommodate
the majority of capital provided that the wage set by the union is not too high.
5.3 Equilibrium wage rate (stage 1)
We now solve the rst stage of the game. By inserting (35) into the labor demand schedule
and by maximizing the unions objective function with respect to wcuF , we get the following
equilibrium wage rate in the unionized country:
~wcuF = w + 

3fn
l
  w

+ 
2l 2n (4n+ 5)
(1 + n)2f
(36)
which is increasing with trade costs (d ~wcuF =d > 0). By introducing (36) in (34), it appears
that the impact of trade costs on the capital tax rates is ambiguous. Indeed, we have
(a)
d~tcuH
d
=
d~tcc
d
+
d
H( ~wcuF ; )
d
(b)
d~tcuF
d
=
d~tcc
d
+
d
F ( ~wcuF ; )
d
(37)
Hereafter, we make the standard assumption that the reservation wage is just equal to
the competitive wage arising from competitive labor markets in both countries ( w = ~wcc).
We should recall that the rst term in (37-a) and (37-b) is not a¤ected by wage
rigidities in country F and describes a non-monotonous relationship between the level of
taxation and trade costs (see Section 3.3). The second term denes an additional e¤ect of
trade integration passing through the labor market in country F . Thus, it is easy to check
that 
F rises when  becomes lower. This e¤ect reveals the negative impact of trade
integration upon the wage claim of the union in country F which allows its government to
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make upwards adjustements of capital taxation. Finally, we verify that the total e¤ect of
trade openness on the capital tax rate in the unionized country is positive provided that
trade costs are low enough ( < =2) or, otherwise, when the union su¢ ciently values
wages over employment. For instance, assuming a rent maximization behavior ( = 1=2),
the capital tax rate prevailing in country F always increases with trade integration.
The e¤ect of trade integration upon tax burden on capital located in the non-unionized
country di¤ers. Indeed, as trade integration gives rise to a fall in the cost of labor in
the unionized country, the government of country H has an incentive to make a down-
wards adjustment of its taxation. For instance, assuming a rent maximization behavior
( = 1=2), 
H is continuously decreasing with trade liberalization. In this case, provided
that  > =2, capital taxation always adjusts downward with reduced trade costs as both
tcc and 
H diminish with lower levels of  . For  < =2, trade liberalization generates
two e¤ects which act in opposite directions and the net e¤ect becomes ambiguous. Never-
theless, for the most general case ( 2 (0; 1)), trivial calculations reveal that d~tcuH =d > 0
is more likely to occur when decreasing trade costs lead to an important erosion of the
wage set by the monopoly union in country F , that is when  and  take initially high
values. In this case, a downwards adjustment of capital taxation in country H is the best
response to a more and more ompetitive labor cost in country F even if the latter country
may simultaneously make an upwards adjustment of its taxation.16
The impact of trade costs upon the tax wedge can be described as follows d(~tcuH  
~tcuF )=d =d(
H  
F )=d . Trivial calculations show that d(~tcuH   ~tcuF )=d R 0 when  ? ^
with:
^ =
(1 + n)4 2f 4
f 4 (48n+ 65) (1 + n)4 2 + 16l2 2 (3n+ 4) (4n+ 5)

2f 2 (1 + n)2 + l2 2 (4n+ 5)

We check that ^ is strictly decreasing with  and equals 1=(65 + 48n) when trade integra-
tion is perfect ( = 0). Consequently, for a very large range of  values and, for example,
when  = 1=2, trade integration induces a fall in the international corporate tax wedge.
This result is consistent with the analysis above where we show that a decrease in trade
costs is more likely to lead to a higher level of capital taxation in country F and a lower
level in country H.
We now turn to the location of rms at the SPNE. One key question we have to
16To understand this result, we should observe that d2
H=dwcuF d , d
2wcuF =d
2 and d2wcuF =dd are all
positive. Thus, a strong preference for wages over employment and high trade costs foster the positive
impact of trade costs upon the capital tax in country H: It is intuitive since both parameters  and 
increase the importance of the wage level in country F for the tax policy in country H.
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address is whether or not country F can be a net-importer of capital or host a majority
of rms despite the rigidities on its labor market. By inserting the equilibrium level of
~wcuF into the location equilibrium (35), we get ~
cu ? 1
2
if and only if
 ?  = f
2 (n+ 1)2
4l2 (4n+ 5) + 5f 2 (n+ 1)2
Clearly, the country with labor market rigidities may host a majority of rms (~
cu
< 1=2).
Such a scenario occurs when the relative importance of wages over employment for the
trade union and the resulting wage equilibrium are not too high (low ). ). It is excluded,
for instance, when we assume the rent maximization hypothesis. In which case, country
F is a net-exporter of capital because the level of capital taxation in this country is
always insu¢ cient to compensate rms for high labor costs and to render this country
more attractive. Interestingly, it gives us a new insight into the locational e¤ects of
tax competition. Indeed, a standard result in the tax competition literature with perfect
competition and countries with asymmetric sizes is that the country with the lowest
capital taxation (the small country) will always be a net-importer of capital (see Wilson
and Wildasin, 2004 , Bucovesky, 1991). This result is commonly challenged in the New
Economic Geography models where, thanks to the existence of an agglomeration rent,
the large country is not only the country with the lowest capital taxation but also a net-
importer of capital. Here, we show that, by considering an asymmetry not as exogenous
(market sizes) but rather as endogenously determined by the behavior of a monopoly
union acting as Stackelberg leader, both scenarios can occur.
Finally, we observe that the mass of capital within the country with a free labor
market decreases with trade integration (d~
cu
=d > 0). This result comes from the
di¤erent impact of trade integration upon wages in each country. Indeed, the competitive
wage in country H decreases with trade integration but less strongly than the wage in
the unionized country so that trade integration induces a wage convergence (d( ~wcuF  
~wcuH )=d > 0). Hence, on the one hand trade integration reduces the scalincentive to
locate in the unionized country whilst, on the other hand, the labor costis an incentive
to locate in the country with a competitive labor market. As the mass of capital invested
in country H decreases with trade integration, we can conclude that the second e¤ect is
dominant.
Proposition 4 Assume a monopoly union in one country whereas the labor market of
the other country is competitive. Due to capital tax competition, the unionized country
sets a lower capital tax and attracts a higher share of capital provided that the relative
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importance of wages over employment for the monopoly union is not too high. The mass
of capital invested in this country increases with trade integration.
6 Discussion
Until now, we considered the trade unions to be acting as Stackelberg leaders. In the
appendix, we present the results with two alternative timings of events: when governments
act as Stackelberg leaders (as in Palokangas, 1989, Fuest and Huber, 1999) and when
governments and trade unions play simultaneously. For the latter conguration, the four
propositions still prevail, although proposition 3 is a¤ected when governments act as
Stackelberg leaders for trivial reasons. Indeed, when both labor markets are unionized
and governments are Stackelberg leaders, equilibrium taxes follow a J-shaped relationship
with trade integration (d~tuui =d ? 0 when  ? =2), as they do when labor markets are
competitive. This result is very intuitive. Since the tax equilibrium does not depend
upon the unionswage claim, trade integration does not have a positive indirect e¤ect
upon capital taxation through the wage rate set by unions. No forces a¤ect the J-shaped
relationship also obtained with exible labor markets. Such a result di¤ers from the
case where the union is the rst mover. Nevertheless, as soon as monopoly unions have
di¤erent preferences for wages over employment (H 6= F ), the tax reaction functions
are no longer perfectly symmetrical and both preferences are important for the level of
the tax equilibrium. In this case, trade integration a¤ects capital taxes through its e¤ect
on the labor market outcome that governments anticipate. The other propositions (1, 2
and 4) remain valid when governments act as Stackelberg leaders.
Another question we can raise is whether or not results would hold under another
kind of wage rigidity. Following Ogawa et al. (2006), we also parametrized labor market
rigidities in a simple and extreme way, by considering that the wage rate in each country
is set exogenously at a level ! higher than the competitive wage. This wage rigidity being
exogenous and thus independent of trade integration, we cannot discuss proposition 1
anymore and intuitively, capital taxes follow a J-shaped relationship with trade integra-
tion, as when labor markets are competitive. Nevertheless, proposition 2 and 4 remain
valid. A shift from a exible labor market to a labor market with a rigid wage reduces
business tax rates, because of the higher tax base elasticity and the higher cost of labor.
Finally, when there is an exogenous wage rigidity in only one country, we still observe that
its government sets a lower capital tax and, by so doing, is able to successfully attract a
majority of capital provided that the national wage is not too high. In such a case, we
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also observe that trade integration improves the attractiveness of the country su¤ering
from unemployment. Thus, proposition 4 still prevails.
7 Conclusion
Unemployment might be one of the major reasons behind why governments try to attract
rms through their tax policy. In this paper, we have explored the relationship between
labor market imperfections and tax competition in a framework with imperfect compe-
tition and trade costs. Our results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we show that
labor market imperfections in both countries strengthen tax competition as compared
with the case where both labor markets are competitive. Secondly, the impact of trade
integration on tax policies depends on the conguration of the labor market. When the
labor market is competitive, capital taxes follow a J-shaped relationship with trade costs.
By contrast, when labor markets are unionized and preferences of union for wage over
employment are high enough, capital taxes may increase with trade integration whatever
the level of trade costs. This result is valid when trade unions act as Stackelberg leaders
and when trade unions and governments act simultaneously. We also analyze the tax
competition outcome in the asymmetric case where the labor market is competitive in
one country and unionized in the other one. We show that the capital tax rate is lower
in the unionized country and that a majority of capital can locate there under certain
circumstances.
Of course, this model is stylized and ignores important aspects of the wage formation
process. It would be interesting to model wage bargaining in a more general case where
both unions and rms have bargaining power. Moreover, a welfare analysis is needed in
order to know whether tax competition is welfare-enhancing or not when faced with labor
market imperfections. This welfare analysis is left for further work.
Finally, although our paper is motivated by empirical facts reported in the introduc-
tion, an econometric analysis is needed to support our main ndings. More precisely, by
following the literature on tax interactions (Devereux et al., 2008), a tax reaction function
could be estimated. It would consist of regressing corporate taxes on indicators of trade
openness, on labor market rigidities and on the interaction of these two variables.
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Appendix
A- Governments and trade unions play Nash. Let us rst assume that govern-
ments and unions act simultaneously. Thus, each government and each union chooses its
policy by anticipating the location of capital.
Symmetric tax competition. The product market outcome at the fourth stage
of the game is described in section 3.1.1. and the location equilibrium for given taxes
and wages is given by (22). We now solve the last stage of the game where monopoly
unions and governments set wages and tax rates respectively. The monopoly union in
country i determines wuui to maximize Ui = (w
uu
i   w) (Ldi )1 , with Ldi = fnuui while
the maximization program of each government is given by:
max
tuui
W ui = lS

i +
rn
2
+ tin
uu
i +
1
2
(wuui )
2

lei + constant
The labor demand elasticity to the wage rate in country i is now given by:
i =
f (1 + n)wuui
2nl 2 + (1 + n)
 
fwuuj   fwuui + tj   ti

where di=d is still negative. The new e¤ect lies in the fact that the labor demand
elasticity in a country increases with its capital tax rate. Consequently, the higher the
capital tax, the more the trade union is prompted to lower the wage rate in order to
reduce the negative impact of its intervention on the level of employment.
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The equilibrium tax and wage levels are given by:
~tuui  ~tcc  
f w
2
  
1  
l 2n
1 + n
8 i = H;F
~wuui = w +

1  
2ln 2
f (1 + n)
8 i = H;F
First, observe that Proposition 1 and 2 are not altered as we check that @ ~wuui =@ > 0 and
~tuui < ~t
cc. Secondly, note that @~tuui =@ < 0 when  > [a (3+2n)]=[a (5+4n)] 2 (0; 1):
Consequently, trade integration can give rise to higher corporate taxes. This will be the
case if  > =2 and  < a=(5 + 4n) provided that  is high enough and if a=(5 + 4n) <
 < =2 for all values of  2 (0; 1). Thus, the main result mentioned in Proposition 3
- the possibility for trade integration to relax tax competition when trade unions have a
strong preference for wages compared to employment - is checked.
Asymmetric tax competition. The product market outcome at the fourth stage
of the game is described in Section 3.1.1 and the equilibrium location is given by (31).
By solving the maximization program of the monopoly union in country F and the max-
imization program of governments, we obtain the following tax wedge at equilibrium:
~tcuH   ~tcuF =
n[f 2 (1 + n) + 4l2 2]
2 (1 + n) l
(12l2 + 8l2n)  2 + 3f 2 (n+ 1)2)+ (1 + n)2f 2
(4  3) (1 + n)2 f 2 + l2 2(4n+ 5   (3n+ 4)) > 0:
so that the location equilibrium at the SPNE is described by:
~
cu
=
1
2
+
f 2(1 + n)  2(f 2 (n+ 1) + 2l2 2)
(4  3) (1 + n)2 f 2 + l2 2(4n+ 5   (3n+ 4)) ?
1
2
when  ? _ = f
2 (1 + n)
2f 2(1 + n) + 4l2 2)
> 
and with (d~
cu
=d > 0). Thus, proposition 4 still holds.
Evaluating the competitive wage in country F at this location equilibrium, gives us:
~wcuF = w +
n
2(1 + n)l
[f 2 (1 + n) + 4l2 2](5f 2 (n+ 1)2 + 4 2l2 (4n+ 5))
(4  3) (1 + n)2 f 2 + l2 2(4n+ 5   (3n+ 4)) > ~w
cu
H .
Hence, the competitive wage is lower than the wage level set by monopoly union in country
F . Moreover, it is lower than when the monopoly union in country F acts as a Stackelberg
leader.
B- Governments act as Stackelberg leaders. Let us now consider that in the rst
stage, each government chooses its tax policy by anticipating the wage set by unions and
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the location of capital. In the second stage, each monopoly union chooses its wage level,
taking governmentstax policies as given, and anticipating the impact of their choice on
the location of capital. The following stages of the game remain unchanged.
Symmetric tax competition. The product market outcome at the fourth stage of
the game is described in section 3.1.1. whereas the location equilibrium for given taxes
and wages is given by (26). We now solve the second stage of the game where monopoly
unions set their level of wages, taking tax choices of governments as given and anticipating
the resulting private sector outcome. The monopoly union in country i determines wuui
to maximize Ui = (wuui   w) (Ldi )1  with Ldi = fnuui , taking wuj as given as well as ti
and tj. The fact that the government acts as a Stackelberg strengthens the labor demand
elasticity to the wage rate. Thus we obtain:

i
=
f (1 + n)wuui
2nl 2 + (1 + n) (fwuuj   fwuui + tuuj   tuui )
with di=d < 0, di=dt
uu
i > 0 and di=dt
uu
j < 0. The higher the capital tax in a country,
the more the trade union of this country will tend to lower the wage rate in order to limit
the negative impact of its intervention upon the level of employment.
Solving the unions maximization program for each country leads to the following
equilibrium wage:
wuui = w +

1  
2nl 2
f (1 + n)
+

1 + 
tuuj   tuui
f
(38)
As expected, the level of wage chosen by a monopoly union in a country decreases with
the capital tax rate in this country and increases with the capital tax rate in the other
country.
We can now solve the maximization program of each government:
W uui = LS

i +
rn
2
+ tin
uu
i +
1
2
(wuui )
2

lei + constant.
Because each government anticipates the impact of its tax policy upon the labor market
outcome, there is an additional incentive to decrease the capital tax in order to increase
the equilibrium wage rate and to reduce the unemployment rate through a capital inow.17
On the other hand, each government also has an additional incentive to increase capital
taxation in order to reduce the unemployment rate through the wage decrease set by the
17By evaluating the spatial equilibrium at the level of wages set by monopoly unions, we check that a
unilateral increase in capital taxation induces a capital outow even if it lowers the national wage rate.
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union. The tax reaction function of each country is given by
tuui =
2 (1 + )n+ 3 + 
6 (1 + )n+ 7 + 5
tuuj + (; )
These functions reveal that the impact of tuuj upon t
uu
i is positive and is negatively a¤ected
by . Because however,  is identical in both countries and enters symmetrically into the
tax reaction functions, we obtain the following tax equilibrium:
~tuui = ~t
cc   wf=2 8 i = H;F . (39)
Again, capital taxes are lower than when labor markets are competitive so that proposition
2 remains valid. Moreover, they are higher than when monopoly unions act as Stackelberg
leaders (see ??)18.
Finally, inserting these equilibrium taxes (39) in (38), we get the equilibrium wage
rate in each country at the SPNE:
~w uui = w +

1  
2ln 2
f (1 + n)
8 i = H;F:
Again, ~w uui decreases with trade integration and Proposition 1 still holds. Moreover, since
governments set higher taxes when they act as Stackelberg leaders, the equilibrium wage
set by monopoly unions at the following stage is lower than its level when they take their
decision before governments.
Asymmetric tax competition. We now present the result for the asymmetric
conguration where the labor market is competitive in country H while it is unionized in
country F . The product market outcome at the fourth stage of the game is described in
Section 3.1.1. We rst solve the second stage of the game where the monopoly union in
country F chooses the level of the national wage, taking tax choices of governments as
given and anticipating the resulting private sector outcome.
The monopoly union in country F sets wcuF to maximize UF = (w
cu
F   w) (LdF )1  with
LdF = fn (1  cu) where cu (tcuH ; tcuF ; wcuF ) is given by (32). Solving this maximization
program, we obtain:
wcuF = (1  ) w   
l (1 + n) (tcuF   tcuH )  n (2l2 2 + f 2 (1 + n))
lf (1 + n)
. (42)
18The intuition for this result comes from the lower tax base elasticity when governments act as Stackel-
berg leaders. Indeed, the tax base erosion e¤ect is limited by the fact that an increase in capital taxation
is partly compensated by the decrease in the wage rate set by monopoly unions. By contrast, when
governments set their tax policy after trade unions have decided the level of wages, this wage adjustment
does not exist so that an increase in capital taxation induces a more important capital outow.
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Assuming that the reservation wage is equal to ~wcc and solving the maximization
program of governments, we reach the following equilibrium tax gap:
~tcuH   ~tcuF =
n[f 2 (1 + n) + 4l2 2]
8 (1 + n) l
 (1 + ) (1 + n)2 f 2 + 4l2 2(2n+ 3  )
(1  )[ (1 + n)2 f 2 + l2 2(4n+ 5  )] > 0:
Hence, we can describe the location equilibrium at the SPNE:
~
cu
=
1
8
3 (1 + n)2 (1 + ) f 2 + 4l2 2[6 (1 + n) + (5 + 4n)(1  )]
 (1 + n)2 f 2 + l2 2(4n+ 5  ) ?
1
2
when  ?   f
2 (1 + n)
3f 2 (1 + n) + 8l2 2
> 
and we check that d~
cu
=d > 0. Hence, proposition 4 is still valid.
By evaluating the competitive wage in country H at this location equilibrium, we
have:
~wcuH =
nf
8l
4l2 (2n+ 4n+ 5  )  2 + 3f 2 (1 + n)2 (1  )
l2 (4n+ 5  )  2 + f 2 (1 + n)2 < ~w
cu
F .
As in the benchmark case, the competitive wage is lower than the level of wage set by
monopoly union in country F . Moreover, it is lower than when the monopoly union in
country F acts as a Stackelberg leader.
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